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SCHLUP v. DELO
115 S. Ct. 851 (1995)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Lloyd Schlup was brought to trial for the murder of a black inmate,
Arthur Dade, while they were both incarcerated in a Missouri prison.
SchIup was convicted and sentenced to death on the basis of testimony
of two corrections officers who witnessed the attack on Dade; the State
produced no physical evidence linking Schlup to the killing.
The two witnesses testified as follows. OfficerRogerFlowers stated
that he released the prisoners from Walk 2 (one of two walks on the lower
level of the high security area and where Schlup had his cell) for their
noon meal and, after relocking their cells, began to release the prisoners
from Walk 1. After releasing the inmates on Walk 1, Flowers saw an
inmate running against the flow of traffic carrying a steaming liquid.
After this inmate, Rodnie Stewart,1 threw the liquid in Dade's face,
Schlup and another inmate, Robert O'Neal,2 allegedly attacked Dade.
Officer Flowers yelled for help and grabbed Stewart as the other two
attackers fled.
Officer John Maylee testified that he witnessed the attack from
Walk 7 (40-50 feet above Walk 1). His story matched that of Flowers in
most, but not all, respects.3 He added that O'Neal stabbed Dade several
times in the chest after Schlup had jumped on Dade's back. He stated that
he did not see what Schlup or Stewart did after the attack, but that he saw
O'Neal run down the walk and throw the weapon out a window.
Schlup's defense was that he was not the third man involved in the
attack. He rested much of his case on a videotape from a camera in the
prisoners' dining room which "showed that Schlup was the first inmate
to walk into the dining room for the noon meal, and that he went through
the line and got his food."4 The video showed that about fifteen seconds
1 Stewart was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment without the
eligibility for probation or parole. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. 851, 856 n.12
(1995). See State v. Stewart, 714 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. App. 1986).
2 O'Neal was sentenced to death. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. 851,856 n.12
(1995). See State v. O'Neal, 718 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1986).
3 "Maylee testified that he saw Schlup, Stewart, and O'Neal
running together against the flow of traffic, and that the three men had
stopped when they encountered Dade." Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 855 n.6
(citing Trial Tr. at 332). "Flowers noticed only Stewart running against
the flow of traffic, and he testified that O'Neal and Schlup were at the
other end of the walk on the far side of Dade." Id. (titingTrialTr. at249).
4 Schiup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. at 855.
5 Id. O'Neal had to break the glass when he threw the weapon, a
knife, out a window (as OfficerMaylee testified). As a result O'Neal cut
his hand. He stopped at a sink on Walk 2 to try to wash off the blood
before entering the dining room. Id. at 855 n.4.
6 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 855 n.6. Schlup also claimed that Maylee
was "influenced by a postindictment conversation [he had with] another
officer who had talked to Flowers." Id.
7 Id. at 855 & n.5, 856 & n.10 ("Lieutenant Robert Faherty, the
corrections officer on duty in the corridor leading from the prison floor
to the dining room, testified that Schlup was the first inmate into the
corridor.., that he saw Schlup pause and yell something out one of the
windows in the corridor, and that he told Schlup to move on. Faherty
testified that nothing else unusual had occurred while Schlup was in the
corridor.").
after Schlup entered the dining room several guards ran out in response
to a distress call, and twenty-six seconds later O'Neal ran in dripping
blood.5 Schlup also argued that both Flowers and Maylee were mistaken
in their identification of Schlup as the third assailant; Flowers because he
had just brought a visitor to Schlup's cell and therefore had Schlup "on
the brain," and Maylee because he had an obstructed view three floors
above the killing.6 Schlup's argument was focused on the timing of these
events. He argued that since his cell was the one closest to the dining
room, testimony that he walked at a normal, if not slow, pace should
conclusively eliminate him as a possible participant in the killing.
7
As the United States Supreme Court later pointed out, "[n]either the
State nor Schlup was able to present evidence establishing the exact time
of Schlup's release from his cell on Walk 2, the exact time of the assault
on Walk 1, or the exact time of the radio distress call." 8 The fact that the
jury returned a guilty verdict and death sentence9 without knowing the
exact timing of any of these events became critical in Schlup's appeals.
Schlup attempted to obtain relief at state habeas but was unsuccess-
ful. 10 Thereafter he filed a pro se petition for federal habeas relief,
claiming "that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview
and to call witnesses who could establish Schlup's innocence." 11
These witnesses included three inmates whom Schlup said saw the
killing12 and another inmate, Randy Jordan, whom Schlup claimed was
the third participant in the killing. 13 The district court denied relief on
the ground thatSchlup's ineffectiveness claim was procedurally barred,
14
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. 15 After the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari,16 Schlup (represented by new counsel)
filed a second federal habeas petition in the district court.
8 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 856.
9 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Schlup's conviction and
death sentence. State v. Schlup, 724 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1987), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
10 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Schlup's
motion for post-conviction relief. Schlup v. State, 758 S.W.2d 715 (Mo.
1988) (en banc).
I1 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 856.
12 Lamont Griffin Bey, Ricky McKoy, and Van Robinson. Schlup,
115 S. Ct. at 856 n.14. Bey, a black inmate, testified that at the time of
the killing he knew who Schiup was, but did not consider him a friend.
He stated that he saw Stewart and O'Neal's attack on Dade and said
Schlup was not involved. "Bey also stated, 'When this happened, there
was a lot of racial tension in the prison .... I would not stick my neck
out to help a white person under the circumstances normally, but I am
willing to testify because I know Lloyd Schlup is innocent." Id. at 858
n.18 (quoting Affidavit of Lamont Griffin Bey, p.2-4 (Apr. 7, 1993)).
13 Id.
14 Schlup v. Armontrout, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18285 (E.D. Mo.
May 31, 1989).
15 Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming
district court not on procedural ground, but on ground that trial counsel
had not been constitutionally ineffective), reh'g denied, 945 F.2d 1062
(1991).
16 Schlup v. Armontrout, 503 U.S. 909, 112 S. Ct. 1273 (1992).
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In this second petition Schlup raised several claims, including (1)
actual innocence of the crime,17 (2) ineffectiveness of counsel due to a
failure to interview alibi witnesses, and (3) failure of the State "to
disclose critical exculpatory evidence." 18 Schlup's efforts were futile,
however, as the court dismissed thepetition without holding a hearing. 
19
The court held that Schlup had not met the Sawyer v. Whitley20 '"standard
for showing that a refusal to entertain those claims would result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice." 21 Sawyer established that "a
habeas petitioner 'must show by clear and convincing evidence that but
for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the
petitioner eligible for the death penalty."22
Schlup next turned to the Court of Appeals and applied for a stay of
execution pending the resolution of his appeal. The stay was denied.23 In
its final opinion-after Schlup's attorney obtained an affidavit from
former Lieutenant Faherty24 stating "that Schlup had been in Faherty's
presence for at least two and a half minutes; that Schlup was walking at
a leisurely pace; and that Schlup 'was not perspiring or breathing hard,
and he was not nervous' 25-the court held that Sawyer was the
appropriate standard and that Faherty's affidavit was "simply 'an effort




The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
the standard of review for determining whether successive or abusive
habeas claims will be heard on the merits-when the petitioner cannot
establish cause and prejudice-is not the Sawyer v. Whitley "clear and
17 The district court rejected Schlup's motion to supplement the
record "with affidavits from inmates who stated that they had witnessed
the event and that Schlup had not been present." Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 858
& n.18. "Two of those affidavits suggested that Randy Jordan-who
occupied the cell between O'Neal and Stewart in Walk 2, and who ... is
shown on the videotape arriving at lunch with O'Neal-was the third
assailant." Id. at 858.
18 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at857-58. The"critical exculpatory evidence"
included testimony of John Green in an affidavit to the effect that
Green-an inmate serving as clerk of the housing unit at the time of the
killing-was told by Officer Flowers to call for help and that he had in
fact "notified base of the disturbance shortly after it began."
19 Schlup, 115 S. CL at 858.
20 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992).
21 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 858. Schlup filed a motion to set aside the
order of dismissal and two days later a supplemental motion stating that
his attorney had obtained a second affidavit from Green (the housing
clerk) confirming his earlier testimony about calling base shortly after
the killing and identifying Jordan, not Schlup, as the third participant.
The court denied both motions without opinion. Id. at 859.
22 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865 (quoting Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2515).
23 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 859. The Court of Appeals vacated its initial
opinion, Schlup v. Delo, 1993 WL 409815 (8th Cir. Mo.), and issued a
new one also denying relief or rehearing. 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1993).
Missouri's governor granted a stay ofexecution one day before Schup's
execution date. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 860 n.27.
24 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
25 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at859 (quoting Affidavit of Robert Faherty PP
4, 6 (Oct. 26, 1993).
convincing" standard but the lower "more likely than not" standard
espoused in Murray v. Carrier.27 The Carrier standard applies only to
prisoners claiming to be actually innocent of the crime; this small class
of petitioners has the burden of showing simply that "a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.' 28 In addition to clarifying the standard of Sawyer vis-a-vis
Carrier, the Court made it clear that with respect to habeas petitioners
attempting to get evidence into the federal courtroom, the showing of
innocence not connected to any other constitutional claim of error




I. Innocence Alone vs. Innocence Because of Error
The majority held that Schup was not required to meet the high
standard of Herrera v. Collins31 because his claim was substantially a
different claim. Herrera claimed that the Eighth Amendment would not
tolerate his execution, despite the fact that his trial was error-free,
because he was innocent.32 Such a claim is a substantive claim.33 On
the other hand, Schup claimed that his innocence could have been
established but for constitutional violations that occurred at his trial-
namely that his counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washing-
ton34 and that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland35 by with-
holding exculpatory evidence. In contrast to Herrera's free-standing
claim of innocence, this type of claim is procedural, said the Court.
26 Schlup, 11 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court
later held that although the Eighth Circuit "seems to have misapplied
Sawyer, we do not rest our decision [reversing the Eighth Circuit] on that
ground because we conclude that in a case such as this, the Sawyer, [sic)
standard does not apply." Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865.
27 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865. As a result of this holding, Schlup's
case was remanded for consideration under the lower Carrier standard.
See Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
28 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496).
29 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
30 The lowest of the "access" standards is, of course, cause and
prejudice for the default, as outlined in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977). Schlup faces an identical standard on the substance of his
ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims.
31 113 S. Ct. 853. The Herrera court did not actually establish a
standard of proof for such a claim. It merely assumed that federal courts
could hear it if evidence of innocence was "truly persuasive" and that the
doors of state courts were closed. Herrera's evidence was seen as not
persuasive. Id. at 869.
32 Id.
33 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 860.
34 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984) (holding that a petitioner claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel must show two things: first, that
"counsel's assistance was [not] reasonable considering all the circum-
stances," and second, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different").
35 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Therefore, having filed a successive or abusive second federal habeas
petition, "Schlup may obtain review of his constitutional claims only if
he falls within 'the narrow class of cases... implicating a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.' Schlup's claim of innocence is offered only to
bring him within this 'narrow class of cases.'
36
What Schlup was claiming could "not by itself provide a basis for
relief;" hence, its success "depend[ed] critically on the validity of the
Strickland and Brady claims."'37 Schlup's conviction should not, there-
fore, be given as much respect as one like Herrera's (Schlup's evidence
carries less of a burden), since without new evidence of innocence "a
concededly meritorious constitutional violation" is not enough to estab-
lish a miscarriage of justice that could serve as the basis for review by a
federal habeas court.
38
The Court concluded that a distinction must be made between
a substantive Herrera claim and Schlup's procedural claim.
Three items of evidence are particularly relevant: the affidavit
of black inmates attesting to the innocence of a white defen-
dant in a racially motivated killing;39 the affidavit of Green
describing his prompt call for assistance; 0 and the affidavit of
Lieutenant Faherty describing Schlup's unhurried walk to the
dining room.4 1 If there was no question about the fairness of
the criminal trial, a Herrera-type claim would have to fail
unless the federal habeas court is itself convinced that those
new facts unquestionably establish Schlup's innocence. On
the other hand, if the habeas court were merely convinced that
those new facts raised sufficient doubt about Schup's guilt to
undermine confidence in the result of the trial without the
assurance that the trial was untainted by constitutional error,
Schlup's threshold showing of innocence would justify a
review of the merits of the constitutional claims. 42
Because habeas corpus is an equitable remedy, the Supreme Court
has crafted an exception to the "cause and prejudice" standard estab-
lished in Wainwright v. Sykes 43 for review of successive 44 or abusive 45
claims.46 Murray v. Carrier established this exception which allows a
habeas court to hear a claim in order to "correct[] a fundamentally unjust
incarceration."47 As a means of ensuring that this fundamental miscar-
36 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 860-61 (citations omitted). See McClesky
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,493-494 (1991).
37 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861. "In light of our conclusion that the
courts below applied the wrong standard in evaluating Schiup's gateway
innocence claim ... we need not express a view concerning the merits
of Schlup's underlying constitutional claims." Id. at 861 n.30.
38 Id. at 861.
39 See supra note 12.
40 See supra note 18.
41 See supra note 7, and notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
42 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 862.
43 433 U.S. 72(1977). Wainwrightheld thatprocedurally defaulted
claims may be heard upon a showing of (1) cause for non-compliance
with state procedure and (2) prejudice to the defendant.
44 Identical grounds rejected earlier on the merits. See Schlup, 115
S. Ct. at 863 & n.34 (citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,444 n.6
(1986)).
45 Grounds available earlierbut notrelied upon. Id. (citing Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1963)).
46 A trio of 1986 cases can be cited for this proposition: Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (plurality opinion), Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, and
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527.
riage of justice exception would remain rare, the Court required that the
petitioner be innocent of the crime; this exception's protection will thus
never extend to "prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain."'48
The standard of review established for this category of claims-the
standard that will be applied to Schlup on remand-does not require as
strong a showing as Herrera or even Sawyer. This Carrier standard
requires only a showing that "a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent."49
II. Innocence vs. Innocence of the Death Penalty
What the Court created in Sawyer, and what the Eighth Circuit
wrongly applied in its review of Schlup's second habeas petition, was a
higher standard, appropriate for cases in which the petitioner claimed he
was "actually innocent of the death penalty." 50 For these cases, instead
ofusing the Carrier "probably resulted" standard, the Court has "adopted
a more exacting standard of proof' and "held that a habeas petitioner
'must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitu-
tional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible
for the death penalty." 51 "No attempt was made in Sawyer to reconcile
this stricter standard with Carrier's use of 'probably.'
52
The Court addressed two competing concerns in its analysis of
which standard to apply in Schlup's case: "societal interests in finality,
comity, and conservation of scarcejudicial resources" and the petitioner's
"interest injustice."'53 It concluded that the proper balance---"when the
claimed injustice is that constitutional error has resulted in the conviction
of one who is actually innocent of the crime"-could be struck only by
Carrier and not by Sawyer.
54
With respect to the societal interest, the Court stressed that claims
like Schlup's are quite rare and observed that these claims must be
supported by "new reliable evidence.., that was not presented at trial."
'55
And with respect to the individual interest, the Court stated that the
"interest in avoiding injustice is most compelling in the context of actual
innocence. The quintessential miscarriage of justice is the execution of
a person who is entirely innocent."'56 Therefore applying the higher
Sawyer standard-fashioned to reflect the relative importance of a claim
of an erroneous sentence-to a case like Schlup's would "give insuffi-
cient weight to the correspondingly greater injustice that is implicated by
a claim of actual innocence."'57
47 Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495.
48 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (noting that petitions claiming actual
innocence are extremely rare) (quoting Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452).
49 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 864 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496)
(emphasis added). Kuhlmann added that thepetitioner must show a"fair
probability" that "the trier of the facts would have entertained a reason-
able doubt of his guilt." 477 U.S. at 454,455 n.17.
50 Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2523 (concluding that these type of actual
innocence claims "must focus on those elements which render a defen-
dant eligible for the death penalty").
51 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865 (emphasis added) (quoting Sawyer, 112
S. Ct. at 2515).
52 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 865 (giving as examples "exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence").
56 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 866.
57 Id.
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The CarrierlSchlup standard, although not as exacting as either the
Herrera or Sawyer standards, requires a showing that "a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent. ' 58 This "more likely than not ' 59 level of scrutiny, however,
requires a substantially higher showing than does the Strickland preju-
dice standard for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 60
As noted, the Strickland two-prong test assesses first the perfor-
mance of the trial attorney and second the resulting prejudice, if any, to
the defendant. 61 The crucial part of this test, the prejudice prong,
considers whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."62 The Court held that "a reasonable probability" did not
require a preponderance of the evidence/more likely than not showing,
but that it required more than a showing that the error has "some
conceivable effect."'63 Significantly, the Court stated that a more likely
than not standard-like the newly discovered evidence standard-
"presupposes that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate
and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is
challenged. An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of
the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so..
the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower."
64
Having concluded that the appropriate standard of review for
Schlup's claim was Carrier, the Courtfound that"itsurely cannotbe said
that a [reasonable] juror... would vote to convict [Schlup]. Under a
proper application of either Sawyer or Carrier, petitioner's showing of
innocence is not insufficient solely because the trial record contained
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict."65 This holding is
important because it sends a clear message to lower courts: automatic
approval of convictions will not be tolerated without a thorough consid-
eration of new evidence of innocence, provided the evidence is related to
and supports a claim of constitutional error.
58 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867 ("To satisfy the Carrier gateway
standard, a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt."). It should be noted that the CarrierlSchlup standard which the
Court adopts "focuses the inquiry on the likely behavior of the jurors"
and differs greatly from the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979),
standard of review of insufficient evidence claims; Carrier is much
easier to satisfy. Jackson, the Court emphasized, "looks to whether there
is sufficient evidence which, if credited, could support the conviction."
While Jackson looks at the trier of fact's power to reach the conclusion
it did, Carrier/Schlup looks at the likelihood of such a conclusion. As a
result of these differing perspectives, Schlup (and most petitioners)
would fail under Jackson, since "the mere existence of sufficient evi-
dence to convict would be determinative." Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868-69.
Under Carrier Schlup's claim of misidentification is given consider-
ation, whereas underJackson the mere existence of the identifications by
Flowers andMayleewould exclude anypossibility ofsuccess for Schlup.
I. Schlup: A Lawyer Hero Story
Schlup's case was one that could have easily been lost had it not
been for excellent lawyering on the part of his habeas attorney. If it were
not for his attorney's continuous investigation-his affirmative defense
of his client,66 as opposed to the passive adversarial testing done by
Schlup's trial counsel-Schlup would probably neverhave been granted
a second federal habeas review.
An Eighth Circuit judge who dissented in both denials of federal
habeas relief concluded that Schlup's trial counsel had been ineffective
not despite the fact that he had reviewed 100 interviews conducted by
prison investigators, but because he had reviewed these transcripts and
failed to follow any of them up with his own personal interviews.67 In
fact, Schlup's trial attorney did not interview anyone in person. He failed
to contact any of the many witnesses who proved very helpful to Schlup's
case on habeas: Green, the inmate clerk who telephoned in the distur-
bance; Jordan, the third participant according to Schlup; Bey, McKoy
and Van Robinson, all witnesses to the killing according to Schlup;
Flowers and Maylee, corrections officers who identified Schlup as the
third assailant; and Faherty, the corrections officer who saw Schlup loiter
on the way to lunch.
Schlup's habeas attorney performed commendably. At all stages of
trial and appeal, all attorneys would do well to emulate such diligence.
Although the entire trial was over, he was not satisfied that the first
attorney had found everything there was to find. He was right; there was
much left to be discovered. And it is this sort of persistence, this
continuous investigation, that may very well save Schlup's life.
Summary and analysis by:
Barbra Anna Pohl
60 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867 & n.45 (Citing Strickland, the Schhp
court held that the CarrieriSchlup standard requires the petitioner to
"make a stronger showing than that needed to establish prejudice. At the
same time, the showing of'more likely than not' imposes a lower burden
of proof than the 'clear and convincing' standard required under Saw-
yer").
61 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-96.
62 Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 693-94.
64 Id. at 694 (citation omitted). For a discussion of the Strickland
test, see Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1993), and case
summary of Washington, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 8
(1994).
65 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 869.
66 See supra notes 7, 12, 18, & 24-25 and accompanying text.
67 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 860 & n.26.
